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Abstract
Education and Industrialization
Walter W. McMahon
This is a survey of the current state of knowledge on the relation of
education to per capita economic growth, income distribution, and industrialization.
The analysis finds a highly significant 25% contribution by education to
growth. This is increased another 20% or so in developing countries when the effects
on per capita growth of reduced population growth as women receive education and
as the absorption of otherwise illiterate underemployed into industry are considered
An analysis of investment strategies finds that nations that invest heavily
only in physical capital, or in human capital alone, do less well. The eight with
the fastest sustained per capita growth invest heavily in both, and also exhibit
far less income inequality than the slow growing nations. Rate of return evidence
suggests that investment in primary and lower secondary contributes the most, that
narrow, severely tracked vocational schools are less cost effective, and that modern
advanced technology transfer through education can be effective but with longer
lags
.
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Introduction
Many nov; accept that primary, secondary, and some types of higher
education contribute to growth, development, and industrialization in
developed and developing countries alike. But it is only in the 70 's
and 30' s that techniques have been refined and applied to the more
precise measurement of the contribution of different levels and types
of education to earnings, productivity, industrialization and per
capita economic growth.
Application of rate of return calculations to investment in edu-
cation, as well as of returns to investment in research and to tech-
nology transfer, used appropriately, offer new possibilities for
reducing waste and increasing growth. They suggest which kinds of
investment offer the largest payoffs.
There are at least four advantages to developing and using objec-
tive and accurate rate of return estimates. First, rates of return
(or other benefit/cost comparisons) allow ranking of investment in
different types of education relative to investment in different types
of physical capital and/or in various options for technology transfer.
Such ranking can assist in achieving greater allocative efficiency in
critical saving and investment decisions. Second, use of rates of
return or present value techniques can help to improve the internal
efficiency of education and manpower development systems. Third, rate
of return concepts are familiar to bankers and lenders, although their
_o_
application to human resource development is just now becoming better
known to non-human resource economists. This opens new channels of
communication with sources of development funds. Finally, policies
sd on relative growth payoffs need not be at the expense of equity,
and can in fact help simultaneously to reduce excessive inequality
the distribution erf the fruits of growth, which can become an Lrapor—
: source of political Instability as industrialization occur .
This is because pure internal social rates of return to human resource
investment (with no income distribution weights) frequently turn
to be very high for the same kind of human resource Investments that
simultaneously make the largest contribution to achieving greater
equity in the income distribution (e.g., investment in basic literacy
has social rates of return that average 28% in Africa and Latin
America). Investments in education that have high growth payoffs and
that simultaneously contribute to greater equity in distribution are
not incompatible. Both efficiency and equity can be advanced simul-
taneously by the policies of governments and donors if they choose to
do so, as high per capita growth examples offered below will show.
Because raw labor is usually the most plentiful underdeveloped
resource in many poor countries, emphasis on more efficient human
>urce development is a very promising policy option for growth.
Education and training guided by objective social investment criteria
measuring the returns to basic literacy, to human resource develop
in science, social science, business, and other aspects of technology
transfer can be less costly than emphasizing physical capital imports
-3-
that use more scarce foreign exchange and often aggravate unemployment
and labor absorption problems.
T7hat follows is organized to bring out the current state of knowl-
edge on the relation of education to industrialization and development
rather than emphasizing its historical development. Our concern is
with education's overall impact, and with the returns to different
types of education and in different sectors. There are Insights from
inter-industry studies on the contribution of education and R&D to
productivity growth, as well as from the relation of education to
efficiency in labor markets. Some attention will be given to inef-
ficiencies and inequities that have their roots in the current methods
of financing. Finally, what government can do through more efficient
and equitable human resources development policies to achieve indus-
trialization and growth forms the last strand of inquiry.
I. The Evidence: Education and Industrialization
Since T. W. Schultz's (1961) famous Presidential address to the
American Economics Association, the evidence about sources of indus-
trialization and growth is normally provided in terras of a production
function that includes human capital formed by investment in educa-
tion, raw unimproved labor, physical capital, and finally, technology
advanced by investment in R&D. It is now generally accepted that all
are necessary for industrialization, each as a necessary condition but
none alone as a sufficient condition. It is also generally accepted
that all public and private expenditures on education (including the
investment of foregone earnings), as well as investment in R&D or in
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technology transfer, are forms of investment .«7ith returns later, and
are not inherently expenditures on current consumption. This is not
only because education is productive of earnings over the life cycle
(see Grant, 1985, and U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1985, p. 166), but
also because it contributes In measurable ways to physical produc-
tivity (e.g., Jamison and Lau. (1932) who measure the contribution of
Lon in bushels of wheat). There is also evidence that Lt con-
tributes to inter-industry differences in productivity (see Kendri
1932, pp. 44, 48), to multi-factor productivity growth La micro-
economic data over time (see Waldorf, Rosenblum, and Tennen, 1937),
and to differences in economy-wide per capita growth among the
industrialized and developing nations (see Denison, 1967 and 1934 and
Mcflahon, 1934a and 1987).
Evidence About the Overall Relation of
Education to Industrialization
Anne 0. Krueger (1963) provided clear and dramatic evidence oa the
relation of education to per capita growth. This included the rele-
vance of education to the absorption of labor by the industrial
sector. It was also a precursor of more recent research which views
the total contribution of education to growth as including its
Indirect effects. For example, education raises per capita income by
increasing health and longevity, lowers fertility and hence raises per
capita growth, and embodies new technology so that it is brought to
bear on production in developed and developing countries alike. Her
conclusion, based on her study of a wide range of factor endowments,
is that "the difference in human resources between the United States
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and the less developed countries accounts for more of the difference
in per capita income than all of the other factors combined" (Krueger,
P. 653).
As summarized in Table 1, education alone was found to explain
directly 25-33% of the difference in per capita income. Its indirect
contributions through effects on health and survival (research now
finds clear positive effects of the education of women on the health
of the children, and of the husband, see Michael in McMahon and Geske
(1982) or McMahon (1935c, p. 982), through its effect in lowering
fertility rates thereby raising per capita growth (see Schultz, 1974,
pp. 3-22), and through education's effects in assimilating a larger
fraction of the female population into the industrial sector were
found to explain the other 25% shown in the first column of Table 1.
This adds up to the 50-58% of the growth in per capita income shown
in Table 1 as explained by these direct and indirect contributions of
education.
Overseas education also contributes to industrialization. New
technology is embodied in newly educated scientists, social scien-
tists, engineers, and managers, many of whom return to their home
countries. The foundations for these additional indirect effects
through embodiment of technology in human capital were laid by Robert
Solow (1957) when he concluded that "87% of the increase (in output
per man hour is attributable to technical change and the remaining 12%
to the increased use of physical capital (in the U.S.)." He stressed
that technical change is increased by investment „in research and
development and brought to bear as it is embodied in new machines as
-6-
Table 1
Direct and Indirect Effects of Education on Industrialization
Direct Effects of Basic
Education
Indirect Effects Via:
Better Health and
Increased Age
Reduced Population
Growth Rates
Absorption of a Larger
Percent Into Industry
Advanced Technical
Education that
Embodies New
Technology
Direct Plus Indirect Effects
Total Percent of Per Capita
Income Differences
Explained by Education
Total Return Per Year Per
Unit Invested
Per Capita
Income
Growth
(1)
25-33%
25%
50-58%
Growth of
Output per Worker
in Agricu lture
(2) (3)
7-15% 17-41%
15-25%
30-32%
Return
Per
Year Per
"Dollar"
Invested
(4)
21.2%
25.6%
17-41% 46.8%
Sources: (1) Krueger (1968).
(2) Yamada and Ruttan (1980, p. 560), accounting for differ-
ences between the U.S., Argentina, India, Denmark, and
Turkey.
(3) Jamison and Lau (1982, pp. 10-11). Column 3 assumes an
average educational attainment of farmers in Korea,
Malaysia, and Thailand, the countries studied, of 8
years.
(4) McMahon (1987a, Table 5).
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each new vintage of machines is built (Solow, 1959, p. 90). A similar
effect occurs as education embodies the technology and management
techniques in each new student generation before each one enters the
labor force. Investment in physical capital was then found by Solow
to have a greater effect on growth through this embodiment of tech-
nology. Analogously, the impact of basic education on industrial
eraployability and productivity is augmented by that of more advanced
technical education that brings the more recent technology to bear.
Yamada and Ruttan (1980, p. 560) for example find that technical
education alone accounted for 15-25% of the difference between the
United States and Argentina, India, Denmark, and Turkey in the output
per worker in agriculture after controlling for investment in
fertilizer and machinery, as shown in Table 1. This was in addition
to the contribution they found from basic education. The basic edu-
cation of farmers not only helps to make those employable that move
to urban industrial employments, but it also helps those who stay in
agriculture to adapt to new techniques. Jamison and Lau (1982, p.
10) find that this raises the physical output of the farms they oper-
ate by an average of 3.05% for each additional year of elementary and
secondary education, or by a total of 17-41% for 8 years and 22-51%
for 10 years of schooling in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand as summar-
ized in Table 1. This dissemination of technical change and indus-
trialization of agriculture involving investment in physical capital,
in human capital, and in adaptation of new technologies leading to a
technologically more modern, mechanized, and higher labor productivity !h 4V»e
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agricultural and agribusiness sector is a very important part of the
industrialization process.
Other recent evidence on the overall contribution of education to
industrialization and per capita growth finds that in the industrial
countries, where growth slowed down following the world wide oil price
shock in 1983, education continued its positive contribution to
growth. Simultaneous cuts In rates of investment in physical capital
and in investment in R&D, as well as underut ilization, help to explain
why the overall productivity growth rate was lower. Kendrick (1981)
split the 1960-79 period into two sub-periods and found that the con-
tribution to economic growth in seven out of nine industrial countries
was a larger percent of the total during the later 1973-79 slowdown
than during the earlier faster growth period. Consistent with this is
Denison's (1984) finding that for 1973-81 following the first oil
shock education made a positive .6 percentage point contribution to
per capita growth even though the overall growth of labor productivity
was a negative -.2% as this positive contribution of education was
simultaneously offset by the other negative factors. Denison's re-
sults using growth accounting techniques are consistent with similar
findings by McMahon (1984a, 1984b, 1987a) using multiple regression
techniques with data for the 14 major OECD industrial nations, and
separately for 30 sub-Saharan African nations. For the U.S. alone for
the entire 1948-73 period prior to the first oil shock Jorgenson
(1984) finds that education accounts for almost all (93%) of the
improvements in the quality of labor which in turn accounts for .45
percentage points, or just over 20%, of the overall per capita growth
-9-
rate. For purposes of comparison to the estimates in Table 1,
Jorgenson's estimate is confined to the direct: contribution of educa-
tion to growth and does not include the indirect contributions to the
per capita growth rate. Nonetheless, in Jorgenson's words, education
has been "... a very important source of U.S. economic growth"
(p. 97).
The argument that the causal relationship runs only in the other
direction with higher income and growth rates enabling countries to
invest more in education has been directly addressed in a number o£
studies. There is of course a joint dependence, or two way flow of
causation, as is commonly found in economics. For examples, does in-
come growth cause consumer demand to grow, or is it that consumer
demand increases cause aggregate demand and income to rise? Both of
course are true. A two way joint flow of causation does not invali-
date the causal effects of increased education contributing to
increased per capita growth, so long as checks are made to determine
the time lags and to avoid confusing this with the reverse effect,
while recognizing that a reverse effect of education-induced growth on
support for education after a time delay is of course also present.
Wheeler (1980), Harris (1982), and McMahon (1987a, 1987c) all use
simultaneous equation models to explain differences over time in the
variables (rather than levels) and thereby control for these feedback
effects to the extent that they are simultaneous. After controlling
for these, all find that education has an independent effect on
income. Wheeler's study of eighty-eight countries finds that an
increase of 10% in the literacy rate raises real gross domestic
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product by 8 to 16 percent, an elasticity of .8 to 1.6. Harris
focusing on 66 developing countries finds that increases in the
primary enrollment rate have benefit-cost ratios in terras of their
total growth payoff of 3.4 to 7.4. His study is notable in that he
finds that investment in physical capital plays a weak role .^hen not
supported by investment in- education. McMahon (1987a) includes in-
vestment functions explaining investment in education and in physical
capital as part of the simultaneous equation estimation of the
coefficients as a check for bias produced by the reverse effects. This
study of 30 African countries from 1965 through 1985 arrived at
similar results. He concludes that some of the reverse effects of
growth on investment are simultaneous (i.e., within a five year time
period), but that most occur with a 10 to 15 year lag, especially for
investment in higher education, and can be controlled for either by
using lagged endogenous variables in the regression, or by using a
recursive system that includes separate equations for the feedback
effects, rather than stressing the simultaneity. He presents both,
but opts for the recursive version of the model as did Harris. This
led to direct and indirect independent returns of 21.2% to basic
education and 25.6% to higher education, the latter with a 10-15 year
lag. The latter included investment in higher education abroad, which
takes time, but also facilitates technology transfer. These results
also are summarized in Table 1. In light of the inefficiencies in
resource recovery from parents and students in higher education within
Africa developed by McMahon, this relatively strong augmentation of
the effect of basic education can hardly be explained except in terms
-li-
te
of the extent which the effects from higher education include the
benefits of technology transfer and management techniques adapted and
applied to local conditions.
Technical change sometimes gets brought to bear on production
through formal education which is highly correlated with learning
through experience on the job, sometimes through physical capital
investment, and sometimes through trade. These different means of
bringing technology to bear lead to differences in the measurement of
the effects of education. Industrialization often involves embodiment
of technology in physical capital which makes ever greater economies
of scale possible for example, but it is easy to overlook the fact
that organized production is not possible with a mix of technology
with an illiterate labor force. For instance, oxygen injection and
continuous casting technology goes with ever larger steel plants
(Carlsson, 1980; Eliasson, 1979; NSF, 1980, p. 13, and NSF, 1982, p.
17) which emphasizes the role of technology and economies of scale,
which is only possible in Japan and other nations that have universal
literacy and a relatively highly educated labor force. In other
cases, without major economies of scale, technology is diffused in
part as capital goods are imported (Maddison, 1984). But here again
the amount of "learning by doing" that can occur through experience
on the job is well known to be highly correlated with the amount of
prior education of the workers (e.g., Mincer, 1974, pp. 129-44).
High tech electronic industries are even more human capital inten-
sive, of the type that dominate Taiwan's and Hong Kong's industriali-
zation. These human capital intensive forms of industrialization
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involve considerable embodiment of technology in human capital through
education followed by learning through experience on the job (e.g.
Mansfield, 1980a; Kendrick, 1981), and often prior diffusion of tech-
nology to t/iesc countries as students educated abroad return,
and/or as governments invest in adaptation of technology. Aspects of
this embodiment of technology and diffusion of it through education
are developed by Nelson and Phelps (1966), Schultz (1975, p. 832) and
McMahon (1984b). Arrow's (1962) "learning by doing" can also be
viewed as human capital formation on the job, with the amount of
learning by doing that occurs highly correlated with the amount of
prior schooling
?
as mentioned above. based on studies by Mincer (1974)
and Bowman (1974).
Arrow's approach also has led recently to empirical work that
finds a comparative advantage of educated workers in implementing the
new technology (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1985). The corollary is that
new technology and investment in new machines that embody it in the
reverse causal flow discussed above also raise the demand for more
highly educated workers (ibid, p. 29). This is a very important point
since it is evidence about how technical change offsets diminishing
returns to education. It also suggests that the relative rate of
expansion of advanced education in the developing countries should not
proceed totally independently of the feasible rates of investment in
primary and secondary education and in new physical capital which
together will make the college graduates employable. However, it is
the reverse that is usually true: investment in physical capital is
subsidized with tax subsidies and import licenses (as in Indonesia for
-13-
exaraple) with the result that the capital intensity of production
rises, and underemployment and low and falling labor absorption rates
become a serious problem.
Some Illustrations of What Works and What Doesn't
It is interesting to consider examples of these different invest-
ment strategies to try to see whether either investment in physical
capital in isolation, or investment in education in isolation can
lead to growth, or whether it would appear that the two kinds of in-
vestment are complementary.
Table 2 is intended only to provide some illustrations. The evi-
dence concerning the direction of the flow of causation has been con-
sidered above, and will not be reconsidered here, as have rigorous
studies that test for the net influence of education while controlling
for other influences on growth (e.g., investment in physical capital,
oil price shocks, drought, civil strife, trade policies, etc.). The
rate of return evidence considered later should also be relevant to
the issue of investment strategies addressed here. It would be ex-
pected to reveal the highest social rate of return to that factor in
relatively shortest supply (e.g., rates of return to secondary educa-
tion, for example, vs. rates of return to physical capital investment),
with diminishing returns affecting the returns to whatever input is
not the growth bottleneck at the time.
The four groups of countries (I -IV) in Table 2 are selected from
the 128 countries in the 1986 World Development Report Annex of
Statistical Indicators (pp. 180-241) on which data is available.
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Group I, the lowest income economies, has the lowest real per capita
growth rates from 1965 to 1985 of any group. Group II has stressed
education, the only three countries with over 25% of their govern-
ment budgets currently going to education and quite high enrollment
rates in primary education going back to 1965. Group III consists of
those 10 countries that have increased physical capital investment
most rapidly since 1965, often with (but not always) with far less
attention to investment in human capital. Group IV (which also con-
tains four countries from Group III) are the nine countries with the
fastest real per capita growth in the world since 1965.
The pattern that emerges, with an occasional exception, is that
investment in human capital and in physical capital appear to make a
complementary contribution to per capita growth and to the beginnings
of industrialization. The poorest countries with an overwhelmingly
illiterate labor force (60% or so without primary and over 30-84%
without secondary education), and relatively low rates of increase in
investment in physical capital, have very low rates of per capita
growth averaging only .9% per year since 1965. Their low income is a
cause of the low total investment, of course. But that does not
contradict the proposition in any way that _Lf_ the physical and human
capital investment had been higher, the growth rates also could have
been higher, a chain of causation proposition addressed more rigor-
ously by the recursive models considered earlier.
In Group II, the Philippines have a good educational base. But
there has been more limited (and perhaps inefficient) growth in
physical capital investment there. Education again would appear to
-16-
be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition. Higher education
alone is also not a sufficient condition as illustrated in the case
of Pakistan (Group I) where the attempt to mix expensive scientists
and college graduates with a largely illiterate labor force has led
to a lot of emigration of the educated elite. There have of course
been other factors in Pakistan's case (border wars, civil strife, and
an overvalued foreign exchange, for example), but at least Lt is clear
that higher education alone is not a sufficient condition for growth.
Group 111 countries with 14.4% to 48% per year increase In phsyi-
cal capital investment also have not all enjoyed rapid per capita
growth. The six with slow growth (Group III) have in common large
percentages not enrolled in primary schools in 1965 who are now in
the work force, excepting only Panama. Currently (as well as earlier)
95% are not in secondary schools in Malawi, and 82% in Kenya, in spite
of the somewhat larger percentages of (relatively small) public bud-
gets recently being devoted to education.
Group IV, the nine countries with the highest sustained real per
capita growth in the world since 1965 have in common high rates of
both human and physical capital formation. They are the Republic of
Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, Taiwan, Botswana, Indonesia,
Lesotho, and Jordan. All have had remarkably high percentages en-
rolled in primary education since 1965. Except for Lesotho, Botswana,
and Indonesia which are somewhat special cases (because of the rela-
tionship of the first two to South Africa and because Indonesia is an
OPEC oil exporter) secondary education also is nearly universal in
these countries. The rates of increase in physical capital investment
-17-
have also been relatively high, except for Hong Kong (where the level
however has been a high 24% of GDP). In all of the nine fast growth
cases, relatively high rates of investment in physical capital, which
is a well-known phenomenon, have been complemented by an investment
strategy that includes relatively very high rates of human capital
formation (a fact that is less well known). All had achieved univer-
sal or very nearly universal enrollment at the primary education
level by 1965. Those a bit further along also achieved high percen-
tages enrolled in secondary schools, and virtual universal literacy
of their labor force, usually just prior to their take off into rapid
industrialization and sustained high per capita growth. This combined
strategy is associated with higher sustained per capita growth (and
industrialization) rates than those observed in the other Group III
countries.
The Specific Evidence about Rates
of Return to Investment
The foregoing suggests that the rates of return for achieving
growth may be the highest when investments are made in that factor
input which is in shortest relative supply or in other ways contributes
the most to growth. And this is the very kind of situation in which
recent rate of return evidence is most helpful.
There is now extensive evidence on rates of return to investment
in education for a very wide spectrum of developed and industrialized
countries developed by Psacharopoulos (1973, 1981, 1934, 1985) and
others so that patterns are readily apparent. The results for the
social rates of return summarized by Psacharopoulos (1985, p. 591)
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for 100-125 studies that cover most of the developing countries of
Africa, Asia, and Latin America as well as the more industrialized
countries are shown in Appendix A and Table 3. These social rates of
return are the ones most relevant to development strategies since
they shov7 where the relative growth payoffs are largest. Standard
social rates of return do not include income distribution weights,
although the relation of the types and distribution of education to
the distribution of income as industrialization occurs will be dis-
cussed later. Nor do social rates of return include any shadow pric-
ing of benefits, beyond including earnings before taxes which re-
flects the social benefits generated as taxes finance public goods.
This distinguishes them from private rates. What social rates of
return also reflect in addition to the private costs to families that
are included in the private rates of return are the costs to the donor
and tax costs to the public of the investment. The social rate of
return is a rate of return based on the total resource costs to the
society.
The evidence based on many studies by independent analysts shown
in detail in Appendix A is summarized in Table 3. It shows that the
rates of return to investment in primary education are more than twice
as high as the rate of return to investment in physical capital in the
developing countries. Annual growth payoffs of 23% on investments in
primary education in 26 developing countries, well above the 13% rate
of return to investment in physical capital in Table 3, indicates that
the investment pays for itself in earnings and hence in National
-19-
Table 3
Social Rates of Return to Investment in Education
and Rates of Return to Investment in Physical Capital
Country Group
Industrial Market
Economies (10
countries)
Developing Countries
(4 exporters of
manufactures)-^
Developing Countries
(26 countries)
Rates of
Social Rates of Return Return to
by Level of Education^- Physical
Primary Secondary Higher Capital^
15%'
15%
23%
11%
13%
17%
11%
9%
14%
11%
n.a.
13%
Source: Arithmetic means of studies reported in flp/**-*iiye A
using latest year observations for each country where primary,
secondary, and higher social rates of return are available (secondary
and higher in the case of advanced countries). Most, but not all, of
the approximately 125 studies on which these averages are based refer
to the 1970s and early 1980s.
2
Estimate based on the return in the intermediate countries. The
lack of a control group of illiterates in the industrialized countries
prevents a direct computation there.
3
India, Israel, Singapore, and Yugoslavia.
4
Source: Psacharopoulos (1985, p. 591).
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Incorae Per Person Employed (NIPPE) within four years of the time the
student in question enters the labor force.
Rates of return to investment in secondary education of 17% can
also be seen in Table 3 to be higher than the 13% rate of return to
investment in physical capital. For strict comparability the latter
also must nake allowance for tax supported subsidies such as invest-
ment tax credits and depreciation allowances, which would make the
true social rate of return to private investment in physical capital
somewhat lower than the private rate of return that is normally
reported.
There is a widespread evidence for other familiar patterns that
can also be observed in Table 3. The annual rates of return for
higher education always tend to be somewhat lower than those for
primary and secondary, mostly because each year of higher education
costs more. There is also widespread evidence, observable in Table 3,
that the rates of return to all capital, both human and physical, are
somewhat lower in the more advanced countries where all capital is
relatively more plentiful. They are higher in the developing coun-
tries also because labor without prior education is cheaper, and hence
foregone earnings costs are lower at the same time that human and
physical capital are relatively more scarce.
Primary education is a particularly advantageous investment
therefore, with a high growth payoff. It does not use very much
scarce foreign exchange, apart from foreign support for teacher
training, and it is relatively labor intensive and low cost per child,
characteristics that use the relatively cheaper labor advantage of
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developing countries. Although the evidence consistently points to
the high profitability of investment in primary education (see the
detail in Appendix A), two qualifications are necessary. First, once
primary education has become universal, secondary school graduates are
the ones in relatively short supply and most needed by industry. This
shows up in the form of relatively higher social rates of return to
secondary education, as for example in Malawi (most recently esti-
mated by the World Bank, 1984, at 30%) and in Indonesia (see Mcllahon,
1986b, pp. 2-224). Where labor absorption rates are low, some
unemployment furthermore often appears among primary school graduates
in this special case, rather than among illiterates as before. But it
is a temporary phenomenon while the education system is expanding from
a broader primary education base. Finally, rates of return to
investment in higher education may understate its true contribution
and hence the true social rate of return including technology transfer
since not all the benefits of dissemination of the new technologies
are always reflected in private earnings of salaried scientists and
government workers as alluded to earlier. Shadow pricing could take
this into account, but it is difficult because some benefits are not
realized for many years.
II. Education for Industrialization: The
Efficiency of Training
The efficiency issue, that is, both how the human resource
development and education system relates to the needs of the economy,
or its external efficiency, and how well its teaching and learning
resources are organized internally, that is, its internal efficiency,
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are very important to achieving rapid industrialization and growth.
As suggested above, underdeveloped human resources are often the most
plentiful resource in the poorest countries, and waste in their
development and utilization does not contribute to growth. The
efficiency issue, both external and internal, to be developed in what
follows is the key issue in human resource development, and also in
many ways, in overall development strategy.
It has many dimensions. The dynamic dimension is the rate of
absorption of illiterate raw labor and of improved labor consistent
with the development of the longer run comparative advantages of the
nation in exports as industrialization proceeds. Second, there is the
efficiency dimension of the division of education or training as
between formal schooling and the supplementation of this by firms irith
training on the job. Third, there is the external efficiency question
of the types of education that are most appropriate, the internal
efficiency with which human capital formation proceeds, and the impli-
cations of the efficiency with which labor markets work. We will seek
to discuss only the most important of these external and internal
efficiency issues to industrialization.
Levels of Education Required for Industrialization
Industry cannot absorb large proportions of illiterates, such as
is illustrated in the very wide base of illiterates in the labor force
in sub-Saharan African countries shown in Figure 1 to the bottom left.
The unemployment and underemployment rates tend to be the highest for
these groups. The social rates of return to primary education as was
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Sub-Saharan
Africa
1985
higher
secondary
LJL
40%
>rimary
illiterates
49%
Growth rate* -.1%
Indonesia
1985
L
higher
60%
primary
illite-
rates
27.1%
Growth rate*44.9%
South Korea
1975
^icondar
£22% yr7\secondary \
jT 36%
Ll primary \
—Hiiiif
terajr^c/^.i^
Growth rate*+6.6%
Figure 1
Inappropriate and Appropriate Educational
Attainment of the Labor Force
Source: McMahon (1986b, p. 166).
*Per capita real annual rate, 1965-1984.
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indicated in Table 2 are a high 28 percent. Farther along the route
of industrialization, as illustrated in the center of Figure 1 for
Indonesia where there already has been a big expansion of primary
education, the rates of return to primary education are somewhat lower
reflecting less of a shortage, as one would expect. The social rates
of return to senior secondary graduates which then are in relatively
shorter supply are a relatively high 23-24% (Mcllahon, 1986b, p. 306).
The same pattern exists in Malawi, to cite another example. Still
farther along the path of industrialization, South Korea illustrates
the kind of educational structure of the labor force needed by
industry as shown in the figure to the right in Figure 1.
Korea has a higher labor absorption rate, and much lower unemployment
and underemployment rates, with fewer illiterates.
Unemployment and Underemployment
Even relatively small amounts of temporary unemployment of high
school or college graduates in these situations is much discussed. To
keep it in perspective however, both unemployment and underemployment
is normally much higher among illiterates. Further along in cases
like that of Indonesia, as the bulge of primary school leavers begins
to enter the labor force, more unemployment begins to show up among
primary school leavers. During the 1980 Indonesian Census, for
example, when nationwide unemployment was only 2.8% and averaged 5%
among younger secondary school graduates, nationwide underemployment
(defined as working less than 35 hours a week) was 37.2% (World Bank,
1985, and McMahon, 1986b, p. 127). But this underemployment was
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concentrated heavily among illiterates and primary school leavers in
the villages, where it was 40%. Although underemployment was a lower
17.6% in the urban areas, some of this is among high school graduates
who migrate to the cities and remain temporarily unemployed while they
search for jobs or wait for government jobs. They comprise a pool of
trainable labor of the type required as industry expands.
The limited duration of this secondary school leaver "unemploy-
ment" is the other important dimension of this dynamic job search
process. The evidence produced by many tracer studies for example
finds that the time spent "unemployed" during job search is a declin-
ing function of both the number of months since graduation and of age.
Psacharopoulos (1982) finds that the percent unemployed in Zambia, for
example, declines from over 20 percent one month after graduation to
only a small fraction remaining unemployed six months after graduation
(see Figure 2).
25
20 -
S 15
1
-
o 10
<D
§ 5
Z
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14
Months unemployed since graduation
Figure 3.
Unemployment as a function of time since graduation3
J Source: Psach.iropoulos 1982 p. 151
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For the Philippines, Psacharopoulos and Sanyal (1981, pp. 453,
457) find a similar pattern, with students expecting an average search
time of 4.0 months and graduates experiencing an average unemployment
pli>i search time of 5.3 months. Unemployment generally tends to be
;her among young people, and the developing economies are no excep-
tion (e.g., data for Indonesia in McMahon, 1986b, p. 128). But in the
majority of cases it lasts only a few months at the most. This point
is developed in detailed evidence on the duration of unemployment as
related to education in the developing countries by Psacharopoulos
(1980). The duration of job search also varies by fields. In the
U.S., for example, where McMahon (1985b, p. 4850) found that at a time
when 54.25% of all college graduates had accepted permanent employment
by graduation day, 95% of engineers had jobs, whereas only 40% of the
Liberal Arts graduates and 13.79% of the education graduates had jobs.
However within six months, 96.47% of all graduates had jobs (ibid,
n. 4849).
This temporary duration of unemployment of young people has to do
with imperfections in the labor market that are related to job search
theory but are also largely irrelevant to education policy. In
Indonesia, for example, the government pay scales for those with no
school, primary, and secondary school are from two to 20 times the
monthly income of non-government employees (McMahon, 1986, p. 288).
This pay differential does not persist at the college bachelors level
and above (ibid, p. 288). It also follows a pattern found by
Psacharopoulos (1983, p. 126) for a number of developing countries.
This pay policy results in a long queue of persons with high school
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training in Indonesia that are waiting for government jobs.
Simajuntak (1985) has found with a follow up study that they wait in
fact for an average of two years. Those with less than a high school
education from poor families cannot afford to wait so long, but a
successful wait by high school graduates for two years carries a rate
of return of over 25%. So it is quite a rational decision. Other
portions of the temporary unemployment after graduation is due to
slack aggregate demand, as for example during the 1931-1985 worldwide
recession with repercussions that are still being severely felt in
many developing nations. But most of the structural unemployment right
after graduation is primarily a reflection of the job search process.
Certainly it would be a serious mistake to base longer term educa-
tional investment decisions, which by their very nature should have
the individual's contribution to productivity over his entire life
cycle clearly in view, on the transitory effects of short term
macroeconomic fluctuations or on short-duration job search data.
What Subject Fields Are Needed for Industrialization?
It is clear that beyond basic education, various sets of special-
ized skills are needed in both production and service industries.
Advanced specialized skills are also needed to help develop industries
at the leading edge in fields where a nation has potential comparative
advantage to the point that these industries become internationally
competitive.
The risk is in overlooking the contribution of basic education,
and in overlooking the greater flexibility of general education as
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distinguished from specialized vocational education, to productivity.
The evidence frora ernployability , rates of return, inter-industry
differences in productivity (e.g., Kendrick, 1982), or from differ-
ences in physical output (Jamison and Lau, 1982) all points to the
conclusion that basic literacy in language and mathematics, the
' lity to think, more widely and adaptively, and the simple discipline
of showing up regularly, all of which are taught by schools, con-
tribute directly to productivity. This is general education, albeit
at a very basic level. This is not to say that all courses at the
secondary level in developing countries should be general education,
which may be "vocational" for civil service employments but are not
suitable terminal courses for many other employments . So beyond this
there are the more specialized vocational and technical courses,
focused on training for particular vocations. Considered more compre-
hensively, some can be at the secondary school level, but there are
also vocation-oriented curricula at other levels (e.g., practical
nursing, bachelor's level CPA's, Masters level MBA's, Law degrees, and
even the Ph.D.). At the terminal level educational curricula in all
fields of necessity become "vocational," even Ph.D.'s in Music and
Classics. Viewed in this way, the relevant question becomes how much
and what types of specialized vocational education are appropriate?
There is quite a bit of evidence that developing countries tend to
expand rigidly tracked relatively high cost separate vocational/
technical schools too fast in relation to the ernployability, earning
capacity, and productivity of the relatively lower cost secondary
general education graduates. This is not to say that some practical
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vocational courses for the terminal students in general secondary
school curricula do not make important contributions. For example,
the course in vocational agriculture in rural high schools teaching
use of hybrids, fertilizers, and animal antibiotics is an important
one for those who are to spend their lives in farming. Similarly, in
urban contexts , a vocational course or two can give a student who
might otherwise drop out a trade, and create a cadre of local job
skills that later can be supplemented with more adaptable general
education graduates if the economy finds those skills in short supply.
The problem is instead with the over expansion of rigidly tracked
separate vocational schools. The earnings of the graduates are often
no higher (e.g., McMahon, 1986b, p. 309), even in industry, and the
rates of return are much lower (e.g., 16% for secondary general, and
12% for secondary vocational for developing countries as a whole,
from Psacharopoulos , 1983, p. 589), partly because the vocational
school costs are higher. The parents and students seem to know this
and they try hard to avoid being forced into these schools, where
there is no opportunity to change to other vocations later (on the
option value of education see McMahon, 1985e). Since these schools
require many male teachers, it is extremely difficult to keep them
staffed competently, and the expansion is often both costly and very
wasteful. In spite of the evidence, expansion continues, with
continuing rapid expansion sometimes still supported by donors.
There is further evidence that the reported earnings, and hence
the measured social rates of return to education, are considerably,
higher for those students in developing countries that are employed by
-30-
industry than they are in farming or Government other than the mili-
tary. This reflects the fact that there are excessively low prices
for agricultural products in most LDC's which then leads to an under-
statement of the monetary rates of return to education in agriculture.
Table 4 shows that the returns to education are about twice as high if
the student enters industrial employment in Indonesia, for example.
In other countries returns are also consistently higher in the Private
Sector than in government employment, as seen in Table 4, where there
may be externalities (e.g., the benefit to future generations from the
services of scientists, teachers, and foreign service officers that
are not fully captured in current civil service earnings). This dif-
ference is in spite of the fact that the private sector includes
street vendors and many other lower income employments that are not
usually thought of as "industry." The significance of this evidence
is that as persons shift from agriculture and government employments
into private industries as industrialization occurs, the rates of
return to education since they are higher in these industries should
cause the overall average rates of return to rise.
Finally, Table 5 shows a variation in the returns to education by
subject field. Returns and rates of return tend to be higher in those
fields that are in demand and where there are jobs, and lower where
there are fewer jobs. Higher returns in engineering and in economics
in the developing countries than in other fields can be clearly seen
in Table 5. High returns in medicine as well as in law (lawyers
familiar with contracts, and legal forms of organization, for example,
are also needed if businesses are to operate), both of which are human
-31-
Table 4
Social Rates of Return by Type of Employment
in Middle and Lower Income Countries-'-
Indonesia (Males only, 1982)
Primary Education
Senior Secondary General
Senior Sec. Vocational/Tech,
Senior Sec. Commercial
Teachers Training Sec.
Brazil
Colombia
Guetamala
Malaysia
Pakistan
Portugal
Tanzania
Venezuela
Industry Private Government
Only Sector (Non Military)
35% 15% 17%
49% 19% 14%
1% 14% 12%
51% 20% 13%
20% 12%
19.3% 14.9%
14.6% 13.4%
12.7% 10.6%
22.5% 17.7%
7.6% 7.4%
3.0% 4.9%
14.2% 10.7%
11.1% 10.6%
"Sources: For Indonesia: McMahon (1986, pg. 306).
For all other countries: Psacharopoulos (1985,
Appendix B-2).
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capital intensive service "industries," is also a pattern as seen in
Table 5.
Students do tend to vote with their feet, and gravitate to those
curricula where the jobs are, and hence where the private rates of
return are high, if not prevented from doing so. In this way, a
decentralized system breaks monopoly quasi-rents and responds to where
the economy's expressed needs are. (See McMahon 1981; McMahon 1984c;
McMahon 1985; McMahon and Geske, 1982, Ch. 3; and Freeman 1971).
Students are currently flocking toward engineering, business, and
medicine in the U.S., for example, and away from teaching, humanities,
and social work where there are fewer jobs, lower salaries, (and hence
lower private and social rates of return). The budget money does
follow the enrollment pressures and the changes in "instructional
units" to some extent, but not fully. So quotas are erected,
standards are changed, and many obstacles are placed in the student's
path. The result is that it is hard for market forces to "get the
prices right," and that large differences in rates of return between
fields persist for long periods of time. This occurs also in develop-
ing countries. There the problem of rigidities to quick adjustment to
market needs is often aggravated by an excessive-commitment to overly
detailed manpower planning. (See Psacharopolous 1984 for analysis of
the problems with the current practice.) Manpower planning may help
to get things started. But if carried too far, it is often oblivious
to the costs, so that detailed manpower planning adhered to too
rigorously is inefficient. The rigidities are overcome in a more
decentralized system by the superior capacity of the latter to adapt.
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The economy needs to respond to the shortages and surpluses of the
types of manpower needed, as signaled to a fair extent by earnings in
relation to costs if the growth process is to be efficient and reach
its potential.
Who Does the Training?
Much learning and human capital formation occurs on the job, more
in some jobs than others. The amount of human capital formation that
occurs on the job is positively correlated with the amount of prior
schooling, in evidence comprehensively developed by M. J. Bowman
(1974) in her "Learning and Earning in the Post School Years." The
amount of human capital formation on the job is also more a function
of the years of work experience on the job than it is of age, in
evidence developed by Mincer (1974), and earlier by Arrow's (1962)
learning curves in the experience with new air frames. (See also
reviews of Mincer and of Dean by McMahon, 1976, 1986c). This inter-
dependence between formal schooling and learning on the job is carried
full circle by the finding in recent NBER research alluded to earlier
that if the investment in new machines which also helps to stimulate
learning on the job brings in the new technology this leads to a
relatively larger increase in the demand for the types of workers that
have more formal schooling.
But given this important interdependence between formal schooling
and OJT which does influence the amount of learning that occurs on the
job, who is to finance this training? The basic economics of this
have been developed by Gary Becker (1983). The principles he develops
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govern the economically feasible allocations of costs both as between
firms and schools and as between firms and their employee-trainees.
Firms have no incentive to invest in training if they can
never recoup the costs. With respect to the allocation of types of
training therefore, the more general marketable skills running from
basic literacy through advanced preparation for professions are too
expensive for firms to provide and must be provided by the educational
system. Firm-specific training however, that type of training which
increases an employee's productivity but is not as marketable outside
the firm, is an investment that the firm can recoup, and generally is
willing to finance. Firms therefore generally support social
investment in formal education, which raises worker productivity in
ways that are less costly to them, and will prefer to locate in those
localities where the education of the labor force and the schools are
good, even though local school taxes are high (e.g., A. J. Heins,
1976, p. 19). But most firms must be given encouragement to invest
if they are to invest more of their private resources in other than
firm-specific training, such as through the 5 to 6% of all company
budgets that firms in Korea are required to spend on education.
Trainees also are more tied to firms in Korea and Japan as a lifetime
commitment than they are in the West. In spite of these two special
inducements for on the job training there, it is likely that a
relatively high proportion of the training still is firm-specific and
less generalizable if the employee should leave the firm.
The other dimension of this allocation of cost is the portion of
the training financed by the firm vs. the portion financed by the
-36-
employee. Employees will frequently defer gratification, or accept
lower current salaries while in training (e.g., apprenticeship wages,
or the salaries of teaching assistants at universities) for a job or a
profession that "has a future." In this case the investment is being
made by the employee, not by the employer or the firm.
But in spite of the basic economics of this which will always
leave the comparative advantage with formal schooling for the more
general and widely marketable skills, and with firms when it comes to
adapting these skills to their more firm-specific unique needs, it
still would help growth if firms could be encouraged to participate
and invest more in training. The basic policy of offering tax
subsidies to firms that invest in physical capital and no similar
subsidies to firms that invest in education and training for example
needs to be re-examined. The capital intensity of production is
increased artificially, contributing to inefficient factor propor-
tions, increasing inequality in the distribution of the benefits as
industrialization proceeds, and serious problems with low labor
absorption rates. The Ministry of Finance in Indonesia is currently
moving to reduce some of these import licenses, overpriced foreign
exchange, and other distorting subsidies to imported physical capital
in the effort to increase the labor absorption rate during indus-
trialization. The same kind of steps need to be taken in many
African countries to foster the kind of industrialization that encour-
ages the use of domestic rather than imported inputs with higher
labor absorption and training rates. If the social rates of return to
human capital formation on the job are as high as they appear to be,
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at least equalizing the incentives to invest in human vs. physical
capital and thereby raising the relative private rates of return to
firms for their investment in on the job training would be conducive
to a more human capital intensive form of industrialization and to
"getting the prices right" for growth.
111. Industrialization, Education, and Improved
Income Distribution
A serious problem in many developing countries in Africa, South
Central Asia, Central America, and South America is that as indus-
trialization proceeds it creates a narrow "modern" sector which then
coexists with a large, poor, traditional agricultural sector and an
unemployable semi-literate population on the urban fringe. The fruits
of industrialization do not reach these latter groups, and there is
excessive inequality in the income distribution among families. In
the poorest countries, for example, the lowest 20% of the households
get only 4.6% of the income and the highest 20% get 54.2% of the
income. Inequality is considerably less in the industrial market
economies where primary and secondary education are nearly universal,
with the bottom 20% of the households getting a larger 6.9% of the
income and the top 20% getting a significantly smaller 40% of the
income. This reduction in inequality which reflects the greater rela-
tive importance of earnings from human capital relative to property
income emerges here in the simple arithmetic averages for the 13
developing countries and for the 18 industrial market economies for
which income distribution measures exist in the World Bank data
(1986a, pp. 226 and 227 respectively).
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Education therefore is not only supportive of industrialization
and rising per capita income, but the distribution of education has
an important bearing on how widely the fruits of industrialization
are distributed. A series of studies commissioned by the Inter-
national Labor Organization and by the World Bank reach the general
conclusions summarized by Psacharopoulos and Woodhall (1985) that:
1. If participation in education is confined to the children of
the rich (as it often is in secondary schools and in univer-
sities in Africa especially,, but also in other developing
countries), education then merely transmits intergenerational
inequality.
2. If certain groups obtain higher financial rewards (e.g., urban
males) than other groups (e.g., inhabitants of rural villages,
especially females), then education increases income
inequalities.
3. If primary and junior secondary education are expanded and ex-
tended more equitably to children (e.g., fees at this level
eliminated), then the famous earlier conclusion of the World
Bank report (1980) is likely to be observed. That is that
"much depends on government policy, which can reduce the
unevenness of the (industrialization) process, and accelerate
growth, by promoting productivity growth in agriculture and
increasing the rate at which (this excess labor in agricul-
ture can be) absorbed into the modern industrial sector''
„
(ibid, p. 41). There are other studies, some of varying
quality, that bring in some of the other factors including
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financing that affect income distribution as industrialization
occurs that are surveyed by Psacharopoulos and VJoodhall (1985,
pp. 244-83). But the simplest generalization goes back to the
basic point that the income distribution later depends heavily
on who gets the education.
The hypothesis that fast growth and increasing equality in the
income distribution are compatible and possible if appropriate govern-
ment policies are followed is consistent with the data for the five
highest inequality and five low inequality countries shown in Table 6.
The low inequality countries include three of the nine fastest growing
countries in the world in terras of sustained real per capita growth
since 1965. Two of the other rapidly growing countries (Hong Kong and
Indonesia) have only slightly greater inequality, and they are two for
which there is no income distribution data available. Taiwan and
South Korea, the two fastest growing countries in recent years, have
aggressively pursued a policy of universal primary education and very
rapid expansion of junior and senior secondary education, as have
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan. In Taiwan, for example, the propor-
tion of primary school graduates that went on to junior high school
increased from 32% in 1951 to 80% in 1971. Illiteracy decreased in
the labor force from 55% in 1946 to 10% in 1980 (Kuo, Ranis, and Fei
(1981, pp. 13, 39,, 64). These education policies that make a broader
spectrum of the population employable as industrialization occurs,
together with an export-oriented growth strategy (e.g., avoiding
getting the foreign exchange overpriced) appear to have been conducive
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to a broader based development and increasing equality in the income
distribution.
In contrast, Brazil and South Africa have pursued policies that
have resulted in some growth, but also have resulted in great inequal-
ity, as shown in Table 6. In neither instance is the equality of
educational opportunity widespread. Chile, for which the income dis-
tribution data is not comparable to the form in which it is reported
for the other countries, may be an example of the fact that great
inequality is not always conducive in the longer run to political
stability (which is of course influenced by other factors as well that
are not the subject of this paper).
IV. What Educational Policies Can and Cannot Do
Many things have been suggested throughout this paper that
education policy, donors, and lenders can do to increase the internal
and external efficiency of the education and human resource develop-
ment systems. The point has been developed that this greater effi-
ciency, guided in part by expanding investment fastest where the
social rate of return is highest, has the potential as a development
strategy of contributing not only to faster per capita growth but also
to reduced inequality in the income distribution.
High priority to expanding both the quantity and quality of
primary education, and then when that is well underway, the secondary
system, not only offers high returns, but also increasing equity.
Vocational and technical high schools seem somewhat less advantageous
when one looks at the evidence, apart from their superficial appeal.
-4 2-
There is evidence that investment in the education of women does have
almost as good a return in terms of earnings. When the indirect
effects of the education of females on the improved health of their
children and husbands, as well as on reduced fertility rates, is taken
into account, the total effects on per capita growth of the education
of women are significantly larger.
It is hard to measure accurately the extent to which higher
education and the advanced training of graduate students abroad
facilitates technology transfer. Donors are prone to concentrate on
higher education policy, which also has a key role in the development
process. But governments and donors must guard against creating a top
heavy system, of which several examples have been offered in this
paper. Although there are lower social rates of return at this level,
the role of higher education in embodying the new technology, in
creating a domestic research capability that is necessary to the
adaptation of technology to local conditions, and the importance of
economies of scale in higher education (e.g., Psacharopoulos , 1980)
justify a continuing judicious expansion at that level in most
developing countries.
With respect to the management and finance of the domestic higher
education systems, somewhat more decentralization of both would seen
to be warranted. The decentralization to universities that avoids
overly rigid manpower planning and encourages universities to set up
job placement services allows students to gravitate to those fields
where the jobs and the growth bottlenecks are. Governments can also
more adequately finance equitable expansion of their higher education
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systems by more resource recovery, combined with tuition waivers and
loans subject to standardized family financial need analysis systems.
Education policy alone cannot reverse low labor absorption rates,
when these are induced by structures of tax subsidies and trade
policies that artificially encourage an uneconomical ly high capital
intensity of production. In this case the tax laws and the tariff
policies need to be changed. Education policy alone cannot eliminate
temporary unemployment caused by the normal duration of job search, or
caused by recessions due to fluctuations in aggregate demand. If
there is queuing for government jobs at the secondary school level that
increases the duration of job search for example, the remedy needs to
be in changing the government pay scales, not the education policy.
If there is slack aggregate demand, created by monetary policies
and/or a world wide recession, education policy is neither an appro-
priate or workable tool to eliminate the general unemployment.
Educational policies should instead look to longer run, lifetime
oriented, human resource investment strategies.
Finally, economic development strategies do need to pay attention
to where the returns are highest, and where equity simultaneously can
be served. The returns to most investments are positive. But that
does not mean that they are necessarily the highest relative to the
alternative use of the scarce resources. The evidence is that the
relative private and social rates of return to investment in human
resources for industrialization are relatively quite high.
Furthermore, industrialization that benefits the few at the expense of
the many is less likely if efficient human resource development is a
centerpiece of the development strategy.
Box 1
Success Stories: What Works
South Korea
For the last twelve years, South Korea has been the fastest
industrializing and fastest growing country in the world, faster than
Japan. What is less well known is its very strong commitment to
expanding the quality and quantity of primary and secondary education
while simultaneously requiring the involvement of firms in more
training on the job. It has maintained a steady growth of demand,
including export demand as labor productivity grows, and a relatively
high .44 labor absorption rate with decreasing unemployment. These
high education and labor absorption factors together with physical
capital investment contributed not only to fast per capita growth but
also to steady reductions in inequality in the income distribution.
The educational distribution of the labor force is shown in Figure
1 for sub-Saharan African currently, for Indonesia currently, and for
South Korean in 1975 just prior to its take off into high sustained
per capita growth. The educational structure of sub-Saharan Africa is
unsuitable for industrialization, and the per capita growth rate for
these countries has been -.1% annually in the period since 1965.
Indonesia, which made a massive effort to expand primary education and
reduce illiteracy now faces considerable pressure to expand junior and
senior secondary education and would appear to be primed for a take
off into rapid industrialization. The educational structure of South
Korea's labor force would appear to be what is required currently for
maintaining rapid industrialization. Korea has even larger per-
centages completing secondary education and above, suitable for the
high-tech forms of industrialization, and has even fewer illiterates
to absorb into the work force.
As further evidence of its strong commitment to education, since
1960 South Korea has differentiated the salaries of its teachers above
those of other civil servants, an especially important commitment to
quality and to retention of teachers in math and science fields.
Since 1960 South Korea also has insisted that companies spend at least
3 to 4% of their total budget on education and training programs,
involving the private sector in the educational process in a meaning-
ful way.
-4 5-
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Box Z
Success Stories
Taiwan
Education was of major concern to the government prior to the fast
industrialization take off that began in Taiwan in the 1970 's. The
expenditure for education, science, and culture accounted for more than
13 percent of the budget at all levels of government during 1954-1968,
increasing to 18 percent by 1971. Because of the government's emphasis
on expanding primary education, enrollment in the 6-12 age group reached
96% by 1961. The proportion of primary school graduates who went on to
junior high school increased from 32% in 1951 to 51% in 1961 to 80% in
1971. These dramatic increases in the number of junior high school
graduates were followed by an equal rate of expansion of the senior high
schools throughout the 1951-71 period preceding the high 9.4% real growth
rate in the 1960's followed by a 9.9% growth rate in the 1970' s.
Illiteracy decreased throughout this period from 55% of the labor force
in 1946 to 10% in 1980.
1
Since industry can not absorb very many illiterate workers who are
too costly to train, and as a high quality labor force is a necessary
condition for effective labor absorbtion, the government's emphasis on
eliminating illiteracy and upgrading education contributed in part to
effective labor absorbtion. Evidence of this is that during the period
that vastly increased numbers of primary and later of secondary school
graduates were entering the labor force, unemployment fell from 6.5% in
1965 to about 2.5% in 1970, and then to 1.2% in 1980. The typical
pattern of rapidly developing countries can be observed as productivity
in agriculture rose sufficiently so that a smaller fraction of the total
population was able to support the entire economy with food and raw
materials. This released workers from the agricultural sector who, since
they met the necessary condition of an adequate education, were absorbed
into industry. Furthermore, an emphasis on expansion of labor absorbing
industries, rather than on giving tax subsidies to the relatively more
Source: Kuo, Ranis, and Fei (1981, pp. 13, 39, 69)
Box 2 (Cont.)
capital intensive types of production that displace labor, contributed
simultaneously to higher labor absorbtion and to a more equitable
distribution of income.
Three out of nineteen manufacturing industries, namely food
processing, textiles and footwear, and electrical machinery accounted for
almost half of the total labor absorbed into manufacturing. These
industries initially served domestic demand as domestic demand expanded
and imports were displaced. Later they continued to expand as labor
productivity continued to increase, aided by the improving formal
education of workers, which contributed to the expansion of exports,
2
mostly to developed countries. As the income from labor and human
capital increased relative to the more unequally distributed income from
property, the degree of inequality in the income distribution steadily
decreased. Unfortunately martial law, and severe limitations on
opposition political parties have prevailed in Taiwan since 1949. But it
is noteworthy that this increased income equality is being accompanied by
steps toward improving political freedom, as evidenced by government
moves toward lifting martial law and lifting the ban on new political
parties to be effective by the end of 1986.
The evidence of the relatively low inequality in Taiwan, South Korea
and Japan is shown in Table 6 in the text. In the case of Taiwan, the
relative share of income received by the top 20% of all households
declined from 41% in 1964 to 37.5% in 1979, and roughly comparable to the
3
39.9% received by this group in the United States. This is far below
the 66.6% of the income received by the top 20% of the households in
Brazil, or the 61% received by this same group in slow growing Zambia and
20p.cit. pp. 122-3.
3 Op.cit. p. 36.
Box 2. (Cont.)
Peru (with negative per capita growth rates of -1.3% and -.1% for 1965-84
4
respectively). The share received by the lowest 40% in Taiwan
increased from 20.3% in 1964 to 22.3% by 1980. By another measure, the
Gini coeficient measuring inequality in the income distribution fell from
.32 in Taiwan in 1964 to .28 by 1980 during its most rapid growth
period. This is clear evidence, very similar to the story for
Korea which is currently the fastest growing country in the world,
that if appropriate basic education policies and appropriate policies for
high labor absorption are followed, fast growth and an equitable sharing
of the fruits of that growth are quite compatible and can be advanced
simultaneously.
^Source: World Bank (1986, pp. 180 and 226).
5 Kuo, Ranis, and Fei (1981, pp. 92-93).
"See Beung Guen Mun, "Sources of Productivity Growth and of
Increasing Equality in the Income Distribution in Korea,"
Unpublished PHD Dissertation, University of Illinois, May, 1986.
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